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Abstract
I propose a finite sample inference procedure that uses a likelihood function derived from the
randomization process within an experiment to conduct inference on various quantities that cap-
ture heterogeneous intervention effects. One such quantity is the number of defiers—individuals
whose treatment runs counter to the intervention. Results from the literature make informative
inference on this quantity seem impossible, but they rely on different assumptions and data.
I only require data on the cross-tabulations of a binary intervention and a binary treatment.
Replacing the treatment variable with a more general outcome variable, I can perform inference
on important quantities analogous to the number of defiers. I apply the procedure to test safety
and efficacy in hypothetical drug trials for which the point estimate of the average intervention
effect implies that at least 40 out of 100 individuals would be saved. In one trial, I infer with
95% confidence that at least 3 individuals would be killed, which could stop the drug from being
approved.
∗Previous versions of this paper have been circulated under different working paper numbers and different titles
including “Counting Defiers,” “A Model of a Randomized Experiment with an Application to the PROWESS Clinical
Trial,” and “General Finite Sample Inference for Experiments with Examples from Health Care” (Kowalski, 2019a,b).
I thank Neil Christy, Tory Do, Simon Essig Aberg, Bailey Flanigan, Pauline Mourot, Srajal Nayak, Sukanya Sravasti,
and Matthew Tauzer for excellent research assistance. Don Andrews, Susan Athey, Victoria Baranov, Steve Berry,
Michael Boskin, Kate Bundorf, Xiaohong Chen, Victor Chernozhukov, Peng Ding, Brad Efron, Ivan Fernandez-Val,
Michael Gechter, Matthew Gentzkow, Florian Gunsilius, Andreas Hagemann, Jerry Hausman, Han Hong, Guido Im-
bens, Daniel Kessler, Jonathan Kolstad, Ang Li, Aprajit Mahajan, Charles Manski, Elena Pastorino, John Pepper,
Demian Pouzo, Edward Vytlacil, Stefan Wager, Christopher Walters, David Wilson, and seminar participants at the
Advances with Fields Experiments Conference at the University of Chicago, the AEA meetings, the Essen Health
Conference, Notre Dame, the Stanford Hoover Institution, UCLA, UVA, the University of Zurich, the Yale Cowles
Summer Structural Microeconomics Conference, and the Y-RISE Evidence Aggregation and External Validity Con-
ference provided helpful comments. I thank Charles Antonelli, Bennett Fauber, and Advanced Research Computing
at the University of Michigan, as well as Misha Guy, Andrew Sherman, and the Yale University Faculty of Arts and
Sciences High Performance Computing Center. I also thank my parents and sister for their support.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
06
73
9v
3 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  1
7 J
ul 
20
20
1 Introduction
Suppose a clinical trial shows that an intervention increases survival. Using standard inference
procedures, we conclude that the intervention must save the lives of some individuals in the trial.
But we care about safety as well as efficacy. Can we also test the hypothesis that no individuals
in the trial would be killed if they were randomized into the intervention arm? I propose a finite
sample inference procedure that allows us to do so.
My main contribution is that I can conduct inference on the number of “defiers,” individuals
whose treatment runs counter to the intervention (Balke and Pearl, 1993; Angrist et al., 1996),
and analogous quantities. The inference that I conduct on the number of defiers is informative
in the sense that it can reject the null hypothesis that there are zero defiers even when the point
estimate of the average intervention effect indicates that there are more compliers than defiers. I
am not aware of any other procedure that can do so using the same data. By performing inference
on the number of defiers and analogous quantities, I offer a novel test of the LATE monotonicity
assumption of Imbens and Angrist (1994) and the related monotone response assumption of Manski
(1997b).
However, my contribution is not limited to informative inference on the number of defiers and
analogous quantities. The inference procedure allows me to provide p-values and confidence in-
tervals on various quantities that capture heterogeneous intervention effects. For some of these
quantities, I am not aware of any previous inference procedures that are informative. For others,
previous inference procedures are informative but approximate or only applicable to a single quan-
tity. I can use the same procedure that I use to perform inference on the number of defiers to
perform inference on the average intervention effect considered by the Neyman (1923) null hypoth-
esis and the fraction affected by the intervention in either direction considered by the Fisher (1935)
null hypothesis. I can also test multiple hypotheses simultaneously.
The inference procedure that I propose is a “finite sample” inference procedure because it fo-
cuses on the finite sample of individuals in an experiment. In their early work on experiments,
Neyman (1923) and Fisher (1935) were both interested in exact calculations on finite samples, but
they could only perform them in very small samples, so the field of statistics largely adopted simpli-
fying asymptotic assumptions. Such assumptions yield approximations that obscure information,
sometimes precluding informative inference. Advances in computational power allow me to forgo
simplifying asymptotic assumptions and perform exact calculations, even in large samples.
For data, the procedure that I propose only requires the cross-tabulations of a binary inter-
vention and a binary outcome. To perform inference on the number of defiers—individuals whose
treatment runs counter to the intervention—I interpret the outcome variable as takeup of a treat-
ment. The required data consist of four numbers: the number of treated and untreated individuals
in the intervention and control arms. I refer to the four numbers as the “data configuration.”
I specify how the data configuration is generated with a model of a randomized experiment that
has two assumptions, where the first draws on the concept of potential outcomes (Neyman, 1923;
Rubin, 1974, 1977; Holland, 1986). It requires that each individual has one potential outcome in
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intervention and one potential outcome in control. Cox (1958) refers to this assumption as the
“no interference” assumption, and Rubin (1980) refers to it as the “stable unit treatment value
assumption” (SUTVA). For a binary outcome, this assumption implies that there are four types
of individuals, corresponding to four “principal strata” of Frangakis and Rubin (2002). When
the outcome represents takeup of a treatment, one of the types represents defiers. Defiers have a
potential outcome of zero in intervention because they are untreated and a potential outcome of
one in control because they are treated, so the intervention effect for defiers is negative one. In the
terminology of Angrist et al. (1996), the other three potential outcome types represent “compliers”
whose treatment aligns with the intervention (intervention effect of positive one), “always takers”
who are treated regardless of the intervention (intervention effect of zero), and “never takers” who
are untreated regardless of the intervention (intervention effect of zero). I refer to the vector of
the number of individuals of each type as the “potential outcome type configuration.” The various
quantities on which I perform inference are functions of the potential outcome type configuration,
and they therefore capture heterogeneous intervention effects.
The second assumption specifies the randomization process within the experiment. This ran-
domization process is a feature of the experimental design. There are many different possible
randomization processes. For example, the experimenter could flip a coin for each individual such
that assignment to the intervention arm is independent and identically distributed. Alternatively,
the experimenter could fix the total number of individuals to be assigned to the intervention arm
and conduct randomization by drawing balls out of an urn. Because the experimenter can con-
trol the randomization process, the experimenter can also build a compelling justification for the
assumption that follows from it.
As the cornerstone for inference, I use the two assumptions of the model to derive the likelihood
function of the potential outcome type configuration given the data configuration. I begin by
deriving a general likelihood function that arises from any known randomization process. I then
present two specific likelihood functions that arise from two specific randomization processes. I
demonstrate that the second specific likelihood function is equivalent to a likelihood function that
appears in Copas (1973).
I use the likelihood function for hypothesis testing and construction of confidence intervals
rather than estimation because there can be more than one potential outcome type configuration
that maximizes the likelihood of the data configuration. For example, consider an experiment
with 100 individuals. There are 176,851 possible ways to divide 100 individuals into four groups.
Therefore, there are 176,851 possible data configurations and 176,851 possible potential outcome
type configurations. However, some potential outcome type configurations cannot give rise to some
data configurations. Among the potential outcome type configurations that can give rise to a given
data configuration, the randomization process dictates that some are more likely than others. By
evaluating the likelihood for a specific randomization process for each of the 176, 8512—over 31
billion—possible combinations of the data and potential outcome type configurations, I know that
the maximum likelihood estimate of the potential outcome type configuration is multi-valued for
14,940 of the 176,851 possible data configurations.
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To conduct inference, I evaluate the likelihood function for every combination of the data and
potential outcome type configurations to construct a likelihood ratio test statistic and its exact
distribution under the null hypothesis. I conduct exact inference in the sense that I control the
type I error rate, the probability of a false rejection, within the finite sample, even when I test
multiple hypotheses simultaneously. I also construct confidence intervals.
I demonstrate that the inference procedure that I propose can conduct informative inference
on the number of defiers by applying it to hypothetical drug trials. I show that the number of
individuals who would be killed by the interventions in a trial is analogous to the number of defiers.
I present data from two trials with 100 individuals. Each trial has a different data configuration.
However, both trials yield the same point estimate of the average intervention effect, which indicates
that there are 40 more individuals who would be saved than killed. This point estimate is highly
statistically significant in both trials. In one trial, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that no one
would be killed at any level. In the other, I reject the same null hypothesis at the 2.8% level, and
I construct a 95% confidence interval that shows that at least three individuals would be killed.
In the same trial, in a joint test of safety and efficacy, I reject the composite null hypothesis that
some individuals would be saved and no individuals would be killed at the 7.6% level. These results
demonstrate that the ability to conduct informative inference on defiers and related quantities could
change the drug approval process.
Several results make inference on the number of defiers seem impossible unless the point estimate
of the average intervention effect indicates that there are more defiers than compliers, and I engage
with these results to investigate how informative inference on the number of defiers is possible. I
begin with the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds (Boole, 1854; Fre´chet, 1957; Hoeffding, 1940, 1941).
These bounds have been applied numerous times in the treatment effects literature (Heckman et al.,
1997; Manski, 1997a; Tian and Pearl, 2000; Zhang and Rubin, 2003; Fan and Park, 2010; Mullahy,
2018; Ding and Miratrix, 2019). I review using my notation that the point estimate of the Boole-
Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower bound on the share of defiers is zero when the point estimate of the average
intervention effect indicates there are more compliers than defiers. Inference using these bounds
cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero defiers in this case, so it is not informative. Ru¨schendorf
(1981) shows that these bounds are the tightest possible given the data and assumptions, making
informative inference on the number of defiers seem impossible.
I perform informative inference on the number of defiers by requiring more data and different
assumptions than applications of the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds. For assumptions, though I
require that the randomization process is known, the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds can be ap-
plied under a weaker assumption that requires the intervention is independent from the potential
outcomes (see, for example, Tian and Pearl (2000)). For data, I require four numbers, whereas
applications of the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds require only two. To understand the conse-
quence of requiring more data, I derive an alternative likelihood function given the limited data
required by the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds, and I use it for inference on hypothetical clinical
trial data. The results that I obtain are still informative about the number of defiers, but they
are less precise than results that use the full data, so the limited data cannot fully explain why
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informative inference is impossible. Therefore, my assumptions must play an important role in my
relative ability to perform informative inference on the number of defiers.
My assumptions also appear to play an important role in differentiating the procedure I propose
from other impossibility results that require more data than I require. Specifically, Balke and Pearl
(1997) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) require data on an intervention, an outcome, and a
treatment that is empirically distinct from the outcome to obtain bounds on the average treatment
effect, and they show that their bounds are the tightest possible under their assumptions. Kitagawa
(2015) builds on testable restrictions implied by their bounds and related testable restrictions
of Imbens and Rubin (1997) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) to test the LATE monotonicity
assumption jointly with other assumptions. He obtains the “strongest testable implication for
instrument validity,” making informative inference on the number of defiers seem impossible. Other
joint tests of the LATE monotonicity assumption also require more data (Richardson and Robins,
2010; Huber and Mellace, 2013, 2015; Mourifie´ and Wan, 2017; Machado et al., 2019). The required
assumptions vary, but to my knowledge, applications of all previous tests joint tests of LATE
monotonicity impose a simplifying asymptotic assumption.
I demonstrate that the lack of a simplifying asymptotic assumption is integral to my ability to
perform informative inference on the number of defiers. I do so by adding an explicit asymptotic
assumption to my model and showing that it is sufficient to yield an impossibility result. I begin by
deriving an alternative likelihood under the model plus the asymptotic assumption. As part of the
derivation, I demonstrate that the resulting likelihood is a weighted average of the general likelihood
that I obtain under the model alone, thereby demonstrating that the asymptotic assumption is a
simplifying assumption that obscures information. Next, I demonstrate that under two different
specific randomization processes, the resulting likelihoods are equivalent to likelihoods that have
been derived by Barnard (1947) and Kline and Walters (2020). While these likelihoods vary with
the average intervention effect and have therefore been used for inference on that quantity, I show
that they cannot be used for informative inference on the number of defiers.
The previous finite sample inference literature does not impose simplifying asymptotic assump-
tions, but to my knowledge, it also does not and cannot perform informative inference on the
number of defiers. This literature began with the Fisher (1935) exact test. Through approxima-
tions of Fisher’s exact test (Dwass, 1957), the subsequent “randomization inference” literature has
developed inference methods based on the randomization process (see Canay et al. (2017) for a
recent example). However, this literature treats defiers and analogous quantities as nuisance pa-
rameters with respect to inference on other quantities (Copas, 1973; Chung et al., 2013; Chiba,
2015; Rigdon and Hudgens, 2015; Ding et al., 2016; Li and Ding, 2016; Ding and Miratrix, 2019;
Wu and Ding, 2020). My primary contribution to this literature is that I aim to perform inference
on the number of defiers, and I recognize that it is possible to do so by deriving a likelihood for
use with a likelihood ratio test statistic. Other test statistics, such as the point estimate of the
average intervention effect, do not explicitly depend on the likelihood that I derive. My secondary
contribution to the finite sample inference literature is that I can use the same procedure to conduct
inference on quantities other than defiers.
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives the
likelihood. Section 3 describes the hypothesis testing procedure and the construction of confidence
intervals. Section 4 presents an application to hypothetical drug trials. Section 5 discusses how
the proposed inference procedure relates to impossibility results from the literature. Section 6
concludes.
2 Model: Derivation of Likelihood
Consider a randomized experiment with sample size s, where s is a positive integer. There is
a binary intervention Z and a binary outcome D that represents treatment. Each individual is
assigned to either intervention (Z = 1) or control (Z = 0), and each individual is either treated
(D = 1) or untreated (D = 0).
I impose the following assumption, which represents the “no interference” assumption (Cox,
1958) or the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1980):
A.1. (No interference). Each individual has one potential outcome in the control arm and one
potential outcome in the intervention arm.
Under A.1, each individual has a potential outcome type, where each potential outcome type is
characterized by a combination of a potential outcome in the control arm and a potential outcome
in the intervention arm. The matrix in Figure 1 includes a separate row for each of the four possible
potential outcome types. The first row gives the number of never takers (D = 0 if Z = 1 and D = 0
if Z = 0), denoted θ(1); the second row gives the number of defiers (D = 0 if Z = 1 and D = 1 if
Z = 0), denoted θ(2); the third row gives the number of compliers (D = 1 if Z = 1 and D = 0 if
Z = 0), denoted θ(3); and the fourth row gives the number of always takers (D = 1 if Z = 1 and
D = 1 if Z = 0), denoted s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3). The potential outcome type configuration consists
of the four nonnegative integers θ(1), θ(2), θ(3), and s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3), which I represent with
θ, in bold to indicate that the potential outcome type configuration is a vector. Although the
potential outcome type configuration consists of four numbers, because the sample size s is known,
the potential outcome type configuration has only three unknown elements: θ(1), θ(2), and θ(3).
The matrix in Figure 1 includes a separate column for each element of the data configuration.
The first column includes the number of individuals observed treated in the intervention arm
(Z = 1 and D = 1), denoted G(1); the second column includes the number of individuals observed
untreated in the intervention arm (Z = 1 and D = 0), denoted G(2); the third column includes
the number of individuals observed treated in the control arm (Z = 0 and D = 1), denoted G(3);
and the fourth column includes the number of individuals observed untreated in the control arm
(Z = 0 and D = 0), denoted s−G(1)−G(2)−G(3). I denote G(1), G(2), and G(3) with capital
letters because they are random variables. The data configuration consists of the four nonnegative
integers G(1), G(2), G(3), and s−G(1)−G(2)−G(3), which I represent with G, in bold to indicate
that the data configuration is a vector. Although the data configuration consists of four numbers,
conditional on the sample size s, it can be fully represented by the three elements G(1), G(2), and
G(3). In what follows, I denote a realization of G(·) with g(·) and a realization of G with g.
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Figure 1: Matrix that Relates Elements of the Potential Outcome Type Configuration
to Elements of the Data Configuration When the Outcome Represents Treatment
𝜃
𝜃
𝜃
𝜃
𝜃 𝜃
Note. s represents the sample size. The potential outcome type configuration θ is the vector of (θ(1), θ(2), θ(3), s − θ(1) −
θ(2) − θ(3)). The data configuration G is the vector of (G(1), G(2), G(3), s − G(1) − G(2) − G(3)). D represents treatment,
and Z represents assignment to the intervention arm. #{·} denotes the number of elements in the set {·}. N(j, k) denotes the
number of individuals in element j of the potential outcome type configuration and element k of the data configuration. All
shaded cells equal zero.
The matrix in Figure 1 relates the elements of the potential outcome type configuration to the
elements of the data configuration. N(j, k) is the nonnegative integer that represents the number
of individuals in element j of the potential outcome type configuration and element k of the data
configuration. The matrix of all N(j, k) has 16 total cells. However, the eight shaded cells cannot
have any individuals in them. For example, consider the upper left cell. Never takers, potential
outcome type j = 1, would be untreated regardless of assignment to the intervention arm, and
individuals in element k = 1 of the data configuration are observed treated in the intervention arm.
By definition, never takers will not be observed treated in the intervention arm, so it must be the
case that N(1, 1) = 0. Similarly, N(1, 3) = 0, because never takers j = 1 will not be observed
treated in the control arm k = 3. The logic for the other shaded cells proceeds similarly.
The purpose of the model is to allow me to derive an expression for the likelihood of the potential
outcome type configuration θ conditional on the data configuration g, the sample size s, and any
other parameters that govern the randomization process from the sample into the intervention γ.
In the equations below, I begin by expressing the likelihood in terms of the probability of the data
configuration. Then, under the assumption of no interference (A.1), I move from (1) to (2) by
expressing the elements of the data configuration G(1), G(2), and G(3) in terms of the cells in the
corresponding columns in Figure 1:
L(θ | g, s,γ) = P (G = g | θ, s,γ)
7
= P
(
G(1) = g(1), G(2) = g(2), G(3) = g(3) | θ, s,γ) (1)
= P
(
N(3, 1) +N(4, 1) = g(1),
N(1, 2) +N(2, 2) = g(2),
N(2, 3) +N(4, 3) = g(3) | θ, s,γ
)
(2)
I can simplify the expression by recognizing that, within an element j of the potential outcome
type configuration θ, the number of individuals in the control arm equals the total number of
individuals minus the number of individuals in the intervention arm. Therefore, in (3), I express
(2) in terms of the four random variables N(1, 2), N(2, 2), N(3, 1) and N(4, 1) that represent the
number of individuals assigned to the intervention arm of each of the four potential outcome types.
I simplify the expression by rearranging the terms of (3) so that the random variables N(1, 2),
N(2, 2), N(3, 1), and N(4, 1) are on the left hand side of each equation, which I express in (4):
L(θ | g, s,γ) = P
(
N(3, 1) +N(4, 1) = g(1),
N(1, 2) +N(2, 2) = g(2),
θ(2)−N(2, 2) + s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3)−N(4, 1) = g(3) | θ, s,γ
)
(3)
= P
(
N(3, 1) +N(4, 1) = g(1),
N(1, 2) +N(2, 2) = g(2),
N(2, 2) +N(4, 1) = s− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(3) | θ, s,γ
)
. (4)
For a given potential outcome type configuration θ, there can be multiple realizations of the random
variables N(1, 2), N(2, 2), N(3, 1) and N(4, 1) consistent with the data configuration g. The prob-
ability expressed in (4) can be written as the sum of the probabilities of each of these realizations.
I express that sum in (5), indexing each realization by setting N(1, 2) = ` for values of ` ranging
from zero to θ(1). Then, in (6), I rearrange (5) to express it in terms of the joint distribution of the
number of individuals assigned to the intervention arm within each of the four potential outcome
types N(1, 2), N(2, 2), N(3, 1), and N(4, 1):
L(θ | g, s,γ) =
θ(1)∑
`=0
P
(
N(1, 2) = `,
N(3, 1) +N(4, 1) = g(1),
N(1, 2) +N(2, 2) = g(2),
N(2, 2) +N(4, 1) = s− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(3) | θ, s,γ
)
(5)
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=θ(1)∑
`=0
P
(
N(1, 2) = `,
N(2, 2) = g(2)− `,
N(3, 1) = θ(1) + θ(3) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `,
N(4, 1) = s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3) | θ, s,γ
)
. (6)
To complete the derivation of the likelihood, I impose a second assumption, which specifies the
randomization process within the experiment:
A.2. (Known Randomization Process within the Experiment: General Case). Individuals in the
intervention arm are selected from the sample through a known process, which yields a known
function f specifying the joint probability mass function of N(1, 2), N(2, 2), N(3, 1), and
N(4, 1) conditional on the potential outcome type configuration θ, the sample size s, and
other parameters that govern the randomization process from the sample into the intervention
γ:
f
(
n(1, 2), n(2, 2), n(3, 1), n(4, 1) | θ, s,γ)
≡ P
(
N(1, 2) = n(1, 2), N(2, 2) = n(2, 2), N(3, 1) = n(3, 1), N(4, 1) = n(4, 1) | θ, s,γ
)
.
Under A.2, I can substitute f for the joint distribution of the numbers of each potential outcome
type randomized into intervention in (6) to obtain a known functional form for the likelihood:
L(θ | g, s,γ) =
θ(1)∑
`=0
f
(
`, g(2)− `, θ(1) + θ(3) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `,
s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3) | θ, s,γ). (7)
Equation (7) provides a general expression for the likelihood of the potential outcome type con-
figuration θ. The specific functional form of the likelihood depends on the known randomization
process. There are many different possible randomization processes. I present two cases here, but
these are not meant to be exhaustive. For the first case, suppose the randomization process from
the sample into the intervention arm is such that:
A.2(iid). (Known Randomization Process within the Experiment: IID Case). Individuals in the
intervention arm are selected from the sample through the flip of a weighted coin such that
Z is independently and identically distributed (IID), the intended fraction in intervention is
p ∈ (0, 1), and the functional form of f is the product of four independent binomial distributions
parameterized by the potential outcome type configuration θ, the sample size s, and the
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intended fraction in intervention p:
f
(
n(1, 2), n(2, 2), n(3, 1), n(4, 1) | θ, s, p) = binom(n(1, 2), θ(1), p)binom(n(2, 2), θ(2), p)
× binom(n(3, 1), θ(3), p)
× binom(n(4, 1), s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3), p),
where binom(a, b, p) is the binomial probability mass function for a nonnegative integer number
of successes a among a nonnegative integer number of trials b ≥ a and probability of success
p ∈ (0, 1):
binom(a, b, p) = P (A = a | b, p) =
(
b
a
)
pa(1− p)b−a.
As one algorithm to implement this randomization process, the experimenter could assign each
individual in the experiment a uniform random number from 0 to 1 and choose individuals with
a number less than p to be assigned to the intervention arm. To complete the derivation of the
specific likelihood for the IID case, I substitute the functional form of f given by A.2(iid) into
the general likelihood expression in (7). Therefore, under A.1 and A.2(iid), the likelihood of the
potential outcome type configuration θ given the data configuration g, the sample size s, and the
intended fraction randomized into the intervention p is as follows:
L(θ|g, s, p) =
θ(1)∑
`=0
binom
(
`, θ(1), p
)
× binom(g(2)− `, θ(2), p)
× binom(θ(1) + θ(3) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `, θ(3), p)
× binom(s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3), s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3), p). (8)
For the second case, suppose the randomization process from the sample into the intervention
arm is such that:
A.2(urn). (Known Randomization Process within the Experiment: Urn Case). Individuals in
the intervention arm are selected from the sample by drawing m names from an urn, where
m is a positive integer less than the sample size s. This process implies that G(1) + G(2)
is constrained to equal m, and the functional form of f is a multivariate hypergeometric
distribution parameterized by the potential outcome type configuration θ, the sample size s,
and the number of individuals randomized into the intervention arm m:
f
(
n(1, 2), n(2, 2), n(3, 1), n(4, 1) | θ, s,m) =
(
θ(1)
n(1, 2)
)(
θ(2)
n(2, 2)
)(
θ(3)
n(3, 1)
)
×
(
s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3)
n(4, 1)
)/(
s
m
)
.
As one algorithm to implement this randomization process, the experimenter could assign each
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individual in the experiment a random number and then choose the m lowest values to be assigned
to the intervention arm. There are multiple related ways to implement the urn randomization
process, such as stratification on the basis of covariates, which imply different functional forms of
f . To complete the derivation of the specific likelihood for the urn case, I substitute the functional
form of f given by A.2(urn) into the general likelihood expression in (7). Therefore, under A.1 and
A.2(urn), the likelihood of the potential outcome type configuration θ given the data configuration
g, the sample size s, and the number randomized into the intervention arm m is as follows:
L(θ|g, s,m) =
θ(1)∑
`=0
(
θ(1)
`
)
×
(
θ(2)
g(2)− `
)
×
(
θ(3)
θ(1) + θ(2) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `
)
×
(
s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3)
s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3)
)/(
s
m
)
. (9)
This specific likelihood appears in Copas (1973).1 However, he does not use this likelihood to
conduct inference on the number of defiers, which he treats as a nuisance parameter with respect
to inference on other quantities.
3 Inference: Hypothesis Testing and Confidence Intervals
Using the likelihood of the potential outcome type configuration θ, I can test hypotheses on various
quantities of interest. Consider the null hypothesis that the potential outcome type configuration θ
is in the set H0. As the test statistic, I use the likelihood ratio, which is the ratio of the maximum
likelihood of the potential outcome type configurations under the null hypothesis to the maximum
likelihood of all possible potential outcome type configurations. For data configuration g, define
the likelihood ratio of g conditional on the sample size s and other parameters that govern the
randomization process γ as follows:
λ(g|s,γ) = maxθ∈H0 L(θ|g, s,γ)
maxθ L(θ|g, s,γ) .
I solve the non-linear integer programming problems in the numerator and denominator of the
likelihood ratio through a grid search over the finite parameter space. Data configurations that are
more extreme under the null hypothesis yield smaller likelihood ratios.
I reject the hypothesis when the likelihood ratio λ(g|s,γ) is below a critical value. To choose the
critical value, I calculate the finite sample distribution of λ(G|s,γ) under all potential outcome type
configurations in the null hypothesis. I choose the critical value as the largest number guaranteeing
that the type I error rate, the probability of falsely rejecting a true null hypothesis, is below the
1To translate from Copas (1973), who presents this likelihood on page 469, N → s, s0 → g(1), n0−s0 → g(2), s1 →
g(3), n1 − s1 → s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3), n(1) → θ(1), nB → θ(2), nA → θ(3), and nAB → s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3).
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nominal level of the test for all potential outcome type configurations in the null hypothesis. The
rejection rule is equivalent to assigning each data configuration g a p-value equal to
max
θ∈H0
P (λ(G|s,γ) ≤ λ(g|s,γ)|θ, s,γ)
and rejecting the test exactly when this p-value is at most the nominal level of the test α. This
rejection rule yields the same results that would be obtained under a “worst case prior” in a
Bayesian framework. By taking the maximum over all potential outcome type configurations in the
null hypothesis, it guarantees that the type I error rate is controlled. This approach is established
in the finite sample inference literature (Chiba, 2015; Rigdon and Hudgens, 2015; Ding et al.,
2016; Li and Ding, 2016). To increase power, it is possible to construct alternative rejection rules
that control different error rates, such as the average type I error across potential outcome type
configurations θ in the null hypothesis.
The test can generate confidence intervals. Suppose we want to construct a two-sided confidence
interval [L,U ] on quantity of interest q(θ) at a (1−α)% level. Define the lower end of the confidence
interval as the smallest real number L such that the data configuration g cannot reject the following
hypothesis at an α/2% level:
H0 : q(θ) ≤ L.
Define the upper end of the confidence interval as the largest real number U such that the data
configuration g cannot reject the following hypothesis at an α/2% level:
H0 : q(θ) ≥ U.
The construction of one-sided confidence intervals proceeds analogously, with tests for the upper or
lower bound at the α% instead of α/2% level. It is possible to compute these confidence intervals
because the domain of the quantity of interest q(θ) is finite, so q(θ) can only admit finitely many
values. Therefore, only finitely many hypothesis tests are required to construct the confidence
interval.
4 Examples: Clinical Trials for New Drugs
Through hypothetical examples, I demonstrate that the procedure that I propose can perform
informative inference on the number of defiers. To do so, I conduct inference on an analogous
quantity—the number of individuals who would be killed if randomized into the intervention arm.
While doing so, I demonstrate that the likelihood ratio test statistic can distinguish between data
configurations that yield the same point estimate of the average intervention effect. Tests from
the finite sample inference literature that use the point estimate of the average intervention effect
as the test statistic would have difficulty distinguishing between such data configurations. I also
demonstrate that the inference procedure provides p-values and confidence intervals on various
quantities that capture heterogeneous intervention effects, including a second quantity for which
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previous inference is uninformative. Finally, I demonstrate that the inference procedure can test
multiple hypotheses simultaneously.
Suppose that a data analyst for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) receives the results
from randomized clinical trials for two new drugs: Vita, which treats prostate cancer, and Mortem,
which treats lung cancer. Especially since the drugs treat different types of cancer, there is no
reason to compare the trial results, so the task of the analyst is to recommend approval or rejection
of each drug independently. In both trials, the intervention provides access to a drug, and the
outcome is survival, which is equal to one if the individual is alive and zero if the individual is dead
at the end of the trial. In each trial, the sample size s is 100. Each trial follows the randomization
process specified in A.2(iid) such that individuals in the intervention arm are drawn independently
and identically from the sample with an intended fraction randomized into intervention of p = 0.5.
The data configurations for each trial appear in Table 1.
Table 1: Data Configurations from Two Hypothetical Clinical Trials
(a) Vita
Number Alive 
in Intervention
Number Dead 
in Intervention
Number Alive 
in Control
Number Dead 
in Control
G(1) G(2) G(3) G(4)
 
                                        = 0.50 − 0.10 = 0.40
25 25 5 45
                  = 0.50                   = 0.10
Point Estimate of the
Average Intervention Effect
Fraction Alive
in Intervention
Fraction Alive
in Control
(b) Mortem
Number Alive 
in Intervention
Number Dead 
in Intervention
Number Alive 
in Control
Number Dead 
in Control
G(1) G(2) G(3) G(4)
 
                                        = 0.70 − 0.30 = 0.40
                  = 0.30                  = 0.70
35 15 15 35
Point Estimate of the
Average Intervention Effect
Fraction Alive
in Intervention
Fraction Alive
in Control
The FDA could be interested in testing hypotheses about various quantities. Table 2 presents
several quantities of interest, and it gives their interpretation when the outcome represents treat-
ment, as in the model, as well as their interpretation when the outcome represents survival, as
in the trials. As shown, the number who would be killed is analogous to the number of defiers.
The average intervention effect is equal to the number who would be saved minus the number who
would be killed, divided by the sample size.
Suppose that the FDA is only interested in efficacy, which it assess using the average intervention
effect. In both trials, the point estimate of the average intervention effect indicates a 40 percentage
point increase in survival, which implies that 40 more individuals would be saved than killed in
each trial. A regression of survival on the intervention indicates that the survival increase is highly
statistically significant in each trial, as shown in the first line of Table 3. This “regression test”
relies on a simplifying asymptotic assumption, and therefore it does not necessarily control the
type I error. As shown in the second line of Table 3, the proposed test of the same null hypothesis,
which does not impose a simplifying asymptotic assumption and controls type I error, confirms the
finding that the average intervention effect is highly statistically significant. Using either type of
inference on the average intervention effect, the analyst would recommend approval of both drugs
at any conventional confidence level.
Suppose instead that the FDA is only interested in whether a drug would kill any individuals,
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Table 2: Interpretation of Quantities of Interest for Treatment and Survival Outcomes
Quantity of Interest
 
Outcome: Treatment Outcome: Survival
Number of Never Takers
Number Who Would Die 
Regardless
Number of Defiers Number Who Would Be Killed
Number of Compliers Number Who Would Be Saved
Number of Always Takers
Number Who Would Live 
Regardless
 
Average Intervention Effect
Fraction Affected in Either Direction
Number of Defiers /    
Number of Compliers
Number Who Would Be Killed /    
Number Who Would Be Saved
(𝜃(3)−𝜃(2))/s
𝜃(1)
𝜃(2)
𝜃(3)
𝜃(2)/𝜃(3)
(𝜃(2)+𝜃(3))/s
s−𝜃(1)−𝜃(2)−𝜃(3)
Note. s represents the sample size.
which is plausible because the entire focus of phase I clinical trials is safety. In trials of all phases,
the FDA assesses safety by monitoring secondary outcomes that capture side effects, and it shuts
down trials if the side effects seem too large. Without data on secondary outcomes, previous
methods cannot inform whether the drug would kill any individuals if the point estimate of the
average intervention effect indicates an increase in survival. However, the procedure that I propose
can test the null hypothesis that no individuals would be killed even if secondary outcomes are not
available. As shown in the third line of Table 3, the data configuration from the Vita trial does
not reject the hypothesis that no one would be killed at any level, whereas the data configuration
from the Mortem trial rejects this hypothesis at the 2.8% level. I cannot infer with any confidence
that access to Vita would kill any individuals, I but I can infer with 95% confidence that access
to Mortem would kill at least three of the 100 individuals in the sample. By analogy, this result
demonstrates that is it possible to perform informative inference on the number of defiers. If the
FDA’s only criterion for rejection is evidence that access to the drug would kill individuals, then
the analyst would recommend approval of Vita but would recommend rejection of Mortem with
97.2% confidence.
It is perhaps surprising that it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that no one would be killed
when the point estimate of the average intervention effect indicates that there are more individuals
in the trial who would be saved than killed, so I provide more detail on the intermediate inputs into
the test. Figure 2 presents three of the 45,951 potential outcome type configurations compatible
with the Vita data configuration and three of the 56,151 potential outcome type configurations
compatible with the Mortem data configuration. It also presents their likelihood values.
The first row of Figure 2 presents the unique potential outcome type configuration in each trial
that is consistent with the Fisher (1935) null hypothesis that no one is affected by the interven-
tion. Given the randomization process, we expect that half of the individuals of each potential
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Table 3: Inference using Data Configurations from Hypothetical Clinical Trials
𝜃
𝜃
𝜃 𝜃 ≤
𝜃 𝜃
𝜃 −𝜃
𝜃 −𝜃
𝜃 −𝜃
𝜃 −𝜃 ≠
𝜃
𝜃 𝜃
𝜃 𝜃
𝜃 𝜃
𝜃 𝜃
𝜃 −𝜃
𝜃 −𝜃 ≠
Note. s represents the sample size. p-values for the hypothesis test are in curly braces. 95% confidence intervals corresponding
to the hypothesis test are in square brackets. A dash (—) indicates that the confidence interval is one-sided. When θ(2) = 0 and
θ(3) > 0, the ratio θ(3)/θ(2) is evaluated as infinity. When θ(2) = θ(3) = 0, the ratio θ(3)/θ(2) is ill-defined, so such potential
outcome type configurations are never labeled as elements of the null hypothesis when conducting inference on θ(3)/θ(2).
Because the joint confidence region on the number who would be killed and the number who would be saved is two-dimensional,
it is not reported in the last row.
outcome type will be randomized into the intervention arm. However, in the potential outcome
type configuration shown for Vita, 25 of 70 individuals who would die regardless are randomized
into intervention (10 fewer than expected), and 25 of 30 individuals who would live regardless are
randomized into intervention (10 more than expected). Similarly, in the potential outcome type
configuration shown for Mortem, 15 of 50 individuals who would die regardless are randomized
into intervention (10 fewer than expected), and 35 of 50 individuals who would live regardless are
randomized into intervention (10 more than expected). The low likelihood values of approximately
0.0000007 (less than one in a million) and 0.000004 (four in a million) confirm the intuition that
these potential outcome type configurations are unlikely given their respective data configurations.
The second row of Figure 2 presents a different set of potential outcome type configurations in
which no one would be killed and randomization is balanced within each potential outcome type.
Within each trial, these are the unique potential outcome type configurations that are consistent
with the Imbens and Rubin (1997) population proportions of each type. The Imbens and Rubin
(1997) population proportions depend on the LATE monotonicity assumption, which implies by
analogy that no one would be killed. They also depend on a simplifying asymptotic assumption
that implies balance between intervention and control within each type given the randomization
process. Given the balance, we intuit that for each trial, these potential outcome type config-
urations are relatively more likely than the potential outcome type configurations shown in the
first row. The likelihood values of approximately 0.004 (four in a thousand) and 0.003 (three in
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Figure 2: Some Potential Outcome Type Configurations Compatible with
the Data Configurations from the Vita and Mortem Trials
Vita: No one affected Mortem: No one affected
Vita: No one would be killed and
balanced randomization within each type
Mortem: No one would be killed and
balanced randomization within each type
Vita: Everyone affected Mortem: Everyone affected
† Maximum likelihood across potential outcome type configurations consistent with the null hypothesis.
‡ Maximum likelihood across all potential outcome type configurations.
Note. The shaded cells equal zero. The likelihood, at the bottom of each matrix, equals the probability of the data configuration
g conditional on the potential outcome type configuration θ. The sample size s equals 100, and the intended fraction randomized
into intervention p equals 0.5.
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a thousand) confirm that these potential outcome type configurations are indeed more likely. In
fact, for both trials, these potential outcome type configurations maximize the likelihood across
all configurations consistent with the null hypothesis that no one would be killed. Therefore, the
numerator of the likelihood ratio test statistic is approximately 0.004 for the Vita data configura-
tion and approximately 0.003 for the Mortem data configuration. For Vita, this potential outcome
type configuration maximizes the likelihood across all possible potential outcome type configura-
tions. Therefore, the denominator of the likelihood ratio test statistic for Vita is the same as the
numerator, yielding a likelihood ratio of one. As a result, for Vita, the likelihood ratio test cannot
reject the hypothesis that no one would be killed at any significance level. For Mortem, however, a
different potential outcome type configuration maximizes the likelihood across all possible potential
outcome type configurations.
The third row of Figure 2 presents the unique potential outcome type configuration in each trial
that is consistent with the null hypothesis that everyone is affected by the intervention. In both
trials, the potential outcome type configuration is the same. However, this configuration implies an
imbalance between intervention and control within potential outcome types in the Vita trial and
a balance between intervention and control within potential outcome types in the Mortem trial.
In the Vita trial, the likelihood value of approximately 0.0000007 (less than one in a million) is
smaller than the likelihood value in the second row, which is intuitive given the relative imbalance,
so it is not relevant for the likelihood ratio test statistic. However, in the Mortem trial, the
likelihood value is about 0.014 (14 in a thousand), which is largest possible likelihood value across
all potential outcome type configurations in the Mortem trial. Therefore, the denominator of the
likelihood ratio for the Mortem test statistic is approximately 0.014, and the likelihood ratio test
statistic for the Mortem data configuration is small and approximately equal to 0.003/0.14 = 0.21.
This low likelihood ratio is below the critical value necessary to reject the hypothesis that no one
would be killed at the 5% level in the Mortem trial.
So far, we have supposed that the FDA is interested in efficacy or safety, but now suppose that
the FDA is interested in testing both simultaneously. One way that the FDA might assess efficacy
and safety simultaneously is to conduct inference on the ratio of the number who would be killed to
the number who would be saved. To my knowledge, previous methods cannot conduct informative
inference on this ratio. Suppose the FDA is willing to approve a drug as long as no more than
one individual would be killed for each five individuals who would be saved. The trolley problem
and the related transplant problem from moral philosophy (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985) consider
a similar criterion. To implement this criterion, the analyst could use the inference procedure that
I propose to conduct inference on the null hypothesis that the ratio of the number who would be
killed to the number who would be saved is less than 1/5 = 0.2. Table 3 shows that the data
configuration of the Vita trial cannot reject the hypothesis at any level. In contrast, the data
configuration of the Mortem trial rejects the hypothesis at a 7.6% level. If the FDA’s only criterion
for rejection is evidence that access to the drug would kill no more than one individual for each five
that it would save, then the analyst would recommend approval for Vita but would reject Mortem
with 92.4% confidence.
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A second way that the FDA might assess efficacy and safety simultaneously is to conduct
multiple hypothesis tests simultaneously. The inference procedure that I propose can do so and
still control type I error, eliminating the usual concern about multiple hypothesis testing. For
example, the analyst could test the composite null hypothesis that no one is killed and at least one
individual is saved. As shown in Table 3, the Vita data configuration cannot reject this hypothesis
at any level, but the Mortem data configuration can reject this hypothesis at the 7.6% level. If the
FDAs only criterion for rejection is that some individuals would be killed and no individuals would
be saved, then the analyst would recommend approval of Vita but would recommend rejection of
Mortem with 92.4% confidence.
5 Comparisons to Related Literature: Impossibility Results
The inference procedure I propose is informative about the number of defiers in the sense that
it can reject the null hypothesis that there are zero defiers even when the point estimate of the
average intervention effect indicates that there are more compliers than defiers, but some results
from the literature make such results seem impossible. These impossibility results impose different
assumptions and use different data. In this section, I discuss how differences in assumptions and
data may preclude the informative inference I demonstrate.
Results that apply the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds (Boole, 1854; Fre´chet, 1957; Hoeffding,
1940, 1941) make informative inference on the number of defiers seem impossible. Boole, Fre´chet,
and Hoeffding derive general bounds on the distributions of random variables, which can be applied
to bound the shares of the potential outcome types in the sample. In Appendix A.1, I review how
inference on the number of defiers based on the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower bound on the share of
defiers is uninformative. Compared to approaches that apply the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds,
the inference procedure I propose requires different data and assumptions. Whereas applications
of the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds require only the shares treated in intervention and control,
I require the four numbers of the data configuration. Furthermore, the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding
bounds can be applied under assumptions that differ from the assumptions I impose. For example,
the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds can be applied under the assumption that the intervention
is independent from the potential outcomes without assuming that the randomization process is
known (see, for example, Tian and Pearl (2000)). To compare the roles of requiring different data
relative to different assumptions, in Appendix A.2, I derive an alternative likelihood using the
data required to apply the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds. In Appendix A.3, I demonstrate that
this likelihood can still be used for informative inference on the number of defiers, suggesting that
the different assumptions I require are instrumental to conducting informative inference on this
quantity.
Results that impose simplifying asymptotic assumptions can also make informative inference on
the number of defiers seem impossible (Balke and Pearl, 1997; Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Heckman
and Vytlacil, 2001, 2005; Richardson and Robins, 2010; Huber and Mellace, 2013, 2015; Kitagawa,
2015; Mourifie´ and Wan, 2017; Machado et al., 2019). Simplifying asymptotic assumptions can
be difficult to understand and critique because they are often made implicitly. In Appendix B.1,
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I engage with literature that requires simplifying asymptotic assumptions by adding an explicit
asymptotic assumption to the model. In Appendix B.2, I show that the model plus a specific version
of the asymptotic assumption is sufficient to derive likelihoods that are equivalent to likelihoods
that have been derived by Barnard (1947) and Kline and Walters (2020). They do not use these
likelihoods for inference on quantities for which informative inference is impossible, and they offer
more straightforward derivations under different assumptions, but I start with the assumptions of
the model to enhance comparability between their asymptotic likelihoods and the finite sample
likelihood that I derive. I conclude in Appendix B.3 with impossibility results that show that these
likelihoods cannot be used for informative inference on the number of defiers.
6 Conclusion
Experiments play an important role in medicine and an increasingly important role in the social
sciences, as they are often seen as the “gold standard” for evidence. I use experimental data to learn
about heterogeneous intervention effects. To do so, I exploit the structure of the randomization
process within an experiment. This randomization process is part of the experimental design, so
it is possible to build a compelling justification for the assumption that follows from it. Even in
natural experiments, it might be reasonable to exploit an assumed randomization process.
I propose a finite sample inference procedure that allows me to test hypotheses and construct
confidence intervals on quantities that capture heterogeneous intervention effects. I demonstrate
that I can conduct informative inference on quantities for which previous methods are uninforma-
tive, including the number of defiers—individuals whose treatment runs counter to the intervention.
I can also use the same procedure to conduct inference on other quantities, such as the average
intervention effect, for which previous methods are informative but approximate or only applicable
to a single quantity.
I demonstrate in hypothetical examples that inference on a quantity analogous to the number of
defiers—the number of individuals who would be killed if randomized into the intervention arm—
can be useful for the drug approval process. The presence of individuals who would be killed by an
intervention that saves lives on average can pose an ethical dilemma: is it permissible to scale up an
experimental intervention that kills some to save others? The inference procedure that I propose
can help to uncover the presence of such a dilemma. In my ongoing research, I am extending
the procedure with the goal of mitigating such a dilemma. By incorporating additional data on
covariates, secondary outcomes, and treatment takeup, I can perform richer inference. The main
goal of such inference is to target interventions toward individuals likely to be saved and away from
individuals likely to be killed. Such inference can also provide novel tests of econometric models.
Notably, in my ongoing work, I consider a model that incorporates data on treatment takeup
in which I can extend the inference procedure that I propose to test the “exclusion restriction”
(Angrist et al., 1996) separately from the LATE monotonicity assumption.
The inference procedure that I propose opens up other important areas for future work. One
is to collect data on the randomization processes for existing experiments and to analyze them
using the procedure I propose. Another is to develop alternatives to asymptotic assumptions that
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simplify computational burdens without making informative inference on defiers impossible.
Appendix
Appendix A Comparison to Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding Bounds
Appendix A.1 Informative Inference on Defiers Applying the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding Bounds
is Impossible
I review here how applications of the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds make informative inference
on the number of defiers seem impossible. To do so, I introduce additional notation because the
primitive objects of the bounds are functions of the primitives of the model. Let v represent the
probability of treatment in the intervention arm P (D = 1 if Z = 1), which is (1− θ(1)− θ(2))/s in
the model, and let c represent the probability of treatment in the control arm P (D = 1 if Z = 0),
which is (1− θ(1)− θ(3))/s in the model. I can express the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower bounds
on the shares of defiers θ(2)/s and compliers θ(3)/s in terms of the average intervention effect,
which in this notation is v − c:
max
{
− (v − c), 0
}
≤ θ(2)/s (10)
max
{
(v − c), 0
}
≤ θ(3)/s (11)
These expressions have been applied numerous times in the literature (Heckman et al., 1997; Tian
and Pearl, 2000; Zhang and Rubin, 2003; Mullahy, 2018; Ding and Miratrix, 2019).2
These bounds can be estimated using the data configuration. The probability of treatment in
the intervention arm v can be estimated with the share treated in intervention G(1)/(G(1)+G(2)),
and the probability of treatment in the control arm c can be estimated with the share treated in
control G(3)/(s − G(1) − G(2)). By combining these estimators, I can construct estimators for
the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower bounds on the shares of compliers and defiers in terms of the
estimator for the average intervention effect G(1)G(1)+G(2) − G(3)s−G(1)−G(2) . An estimator for the lower
bound on the share of defiers θ(2)/s is as follows:
max
{
−
(
G(1)
G(1) +G(2)
− G(3)
s−G(1)−G(2)
)
, 0
}
. (12)
2To translate from Heckman et al. (1997), who give the lower bounds on compliers and defiers on page 502,
PE· → v, P·E → c, PNE → θ(2)/s, and PEN → θ(3)/s. To translate from Tian and Pearl (2000), who give the
lower bound on the share of compliers in equation (14), P (yx) → v, P (yx′) → c, and PNS → θ(3)/s. To translate
from Zhang and Rubin (2003), who give the lower bound on the share of compliers following equation (8), PTG → v,
PCG → c, and piDG → θ(2)/s. To translate from Mullahy (2018), who gives the lower bound on the share of compliers
in equation (26), pi1 → v, pi0 → c, and pi01 → θ(3)/s. To translate from Ding and Miratrix (2019), who give the lower
bound on the number of defiers in Proposition 4, τ → v − c, N01 → θ(2), and N → s. Manski (1997a) and Fan and
Park (2010) also apply the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding bounds to conduct inference on treatment effects, but they do
not supply explicit bounds on the shares of compliers and defiers.
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An estimator for the lower bound on the share of compliers θ(3)/s is as follows:
max
{(
G(1)
G(1) +G(2)
− G(3)
s−G(1)−G(2)
)
, 0
}
. (13)
In my notation, the average intervention effect is equal to the share of compliers θ(3)/s minus the
share of defiers θ(2)/s, so a positive point estimate of the average intervention effect implies that
there are more compliers than defiers. In this case, the estimated Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding lower
bound on the share of defiers in (12) is zero, implying that the lower bound on the number of defiers
is also zero. Therefore, informative inference on the number of defiers is impossible. Similarly,
informative inference on the ratio of defiers to compliers is also impossible. When the point estimate
of the average intervention effect is negative, the lower bound on the share of compliers in (13) is
zero, implying that informative inference on the number of compliers is impossible.
Appendix A.2 Derivation of Alternative General Likelihood Using the Limited Data Required
to Apply the Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding Bounds
While I use both more data and different assumptions than those who apply the Boole-Fre´chet-
Hoeffding bounds, I now demonstrate that the assumptions I impose are sufficient to conduct
informative inference, even with more restricted data. To show this, I derive an alternative like-
lihood in which the available data is limited to the shares treated in the intervention and control
arms, G(1)/(G(1) +G(2)) and G(3)/(s−G(1)−G(2)). I denote realizations of these shares with
v̂ and ĉ. I derive an expression for the alternative likelihood of the potential outcome type config-
uration θ conditional on realizations of the shares treated in intervention and control v̂ and ĉ, the
sample size s, and other parameters that govern the randomization process from the sample into
the intervention γ in the equations below.
First, I express the alternative likelihood in terms of the probability distribution of the shares
randomized into intervention and control in (14). Multiple data configurations can produce the
same shares randomized into intervention and control, so I express the alternative likelihood as
a sum of the probabilities of those data configurations indexed by g(1) in (15). By rearranging
the expression, I can express the alternative likelihood as a sum over the joint distribution of the
data configuration, which I do in (16). Finally, in (17), I replace the joint distribution of the
data configuration with the likelihood expression derived in Section 2 that relies on the full data
configuration:
L(θ | v̂, ĉ, s,γ) = P
(
G(1)
G(1) +G(2)
= v̂,
G(3)
s−G(1)−G(2) = ĉ | θ, s,γ
)
(14)
=
s∑
g(1)=0
P
(
G(1) = g(1),
G(1)
G(1) +G(2)
= v̂,
G(3)
s−G(1)−G(2) = ĉ | θ, s,γ
)
(15)
=
s∑
g(1)=0
P
(
G(1) = g(1), G(2) = g(1)
(1
v̂
− 1
)
, G(3) = ĉ
(
s− g(1)
v̂
)
| θ, s,γ
)
(16)
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=s∑
g(1)=0
L(θ | g˜, s,γ)
where g˜ =
(
g(1), g(1)
(1
v̂
− 1
)
, ĉ
(
s− g(1)
v̂
)
,
s− g(1)− g(1)
(1
v̂
− 1
)
− ĉ
(
s− g(1)
v̂
))
(17)
Appendix A.3 Informative Inference on Defiers Using the Limited Data Required to Apply the
Boole-Fre´chet-Hoeffding Bounds Is Possible but Empirically Less Precise
I demonstrate that the alternative likelihood in (17) can be used for informative inference on the
number of defiers, and I show that inference using this alternative likelihood is empirically less
precise than inference using the procedure I propose. In Table A.1, I compare two approaches to
testing the null hypothesis that there are no defiers in the Mortem example from Section 4. In
the first row, I reproduce the results of the test that utilizes the full data configuration, as also
shown in Table 3. In the second row, I present the results of an alternative test that utilizes the
limited data of the shares treated in intervention and control, using the alternative likelihood in
(17). Both the proposed and alternative tests can conduct informative inference on the number of
defiers. The p-value increases slightly when using the more limited data such that the alternative
test rejects the null hypothesis at the 5.3% level, as opposed to the 2.8% level under the proposed
test. Using more limited data obscures some, but not all, of the available information because there
is still a large number of possible shares treated in intervention and control (160,131) compared
to the possible number of data configurations (176,851). This exercise shows that limiting the
data to the shares treated in intervention and control used in applications of the Boole-Fre´chet-
Hoeffding bounds does not preclude informative inference on the number of defiers, suggesting that
the assumptions I require are instrumental to conducting informative inference.
Table A.1: Inference Using Full and Limited Data
Quantity of Interest Test
Mortem, 
Full Data
Mortem, 
Limited Data
Proposed Test
[3, — ]   
{0.028}
Alternative Test
[0, — ]     
{0.053}
Number Who Would Be Killed
𝜃(2)
Number Who Would Be Killed
𝜃(2)
H0: 𝜃(2) = 0;
HA: 𝜃(2) > 0.
H0: 𝜃(2) = 0;
HA: 𝜃(2) > 0.
Note. p-values for the hypothesis test are in curly braces. 95% confidence intervals corresponding to the hypothesis
test are in square brackets. A dash (—) indicates that the confidence interval is one-sided. The full data consists of
the four numbers of the data configuration g, representing the numbers of individuals alive and dead in intervention
and control. The limited data consists of the two numbers v̂ and ĉ, representing the shares alive in intervention
and control.
22
Appendix B Comparison to an Ancillary Simplifying Asymptotic Assumption
Appendix B.1 Derivation of Alternative General Likelihood under an Ancillary Simplifying
Asymptotic Assumption
Building on the two assumptions of the model, I impose an ancillary assumption that is “asymp-
totic” because it presupposes the existence of an infinite population from which the finite sample
of individuals in the experiment is drawn, allowing for the possibility that the finite sample could
grow. Just as A.2 specifies a randomization process within the experiment from the finite sample,
the ancillary assumption specifies a randomization process into the experiment from an infinite
population. However, the randomization process within the experiment must occur for the experi-
ment to be a “randomized experiment.” In contrast, the randomization process into the experiment
need not actually occur, making an assumption based on it harder to justify. Furthermore, even if
randomization into the experiment does occur, it need not be from the infinite population required
by the assumption. The explicit ancillary asymptotic assumption that I impose for comparison to
the literature is as follows:
A.3. (Known Randomization Process into the Experiment: General Case). Individuals in the
sample are selected from an infinite population through a known process, which yields a known
function h specifying the probability mass function of the sample potential outcome type
configuration Θ conditional on the population potential outcome type configuration pi and the
sample size s:
h(θ | pi, s) ≡ P (Θ = θ | pi, s).
There are many possible realizations of the sample potential outcome type configuration θ that can
be drawn from the population, so I use a capital letter to denote the random vector of the sample
potential outcome type configuration Θ. I introduce pi to denote the population potential outcome
type configuration. I express the elements of the population potential outcome type configuration
pi as shares instead of finite counts to allow for an infinite population. In an infinite population,
these shares remain constant as individuals are randomized into the experiment. The assumption of
no interference (A.1) implies that individuals in the population have one of four potential outcome
types. I use pi(1) to represent the share of never takers in the population, pi(2) to represent the
share of defiers in the population, pi(3) to represent the share of compliers in the population, and
1 − pi(1) − pi(2) − pi(3) to represent the share of always takers in the population. The population
potential outcome type configuration pi consists of pi(1), pi(2), pi(3), and 1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3).
In the equations below, I derive a likelihood of the population potential outcome type configu-
ration pi under A.1-A.3 to yield an impossibility result. I start in (18) with a general expression for
the distribution of the data configuration G given the population potential outcome type configu-
ration pi, the sample size s, and other parameters that govern the randomization process from the
sample into the intervention arm γ. Next, in (19), I apply the law of total probability to represent
the distribution of the data configuration as a weighted average of the distribution conditional on
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the sample potential outcome type configuration θ. I then obtain an equivalent expression in terms
of a likelihood of the sample potential outcome type configuration θ in (20):
L(pi | g, s,γ) = P (G = g | pi, s,γ) (18)
=
s∑
θ(1)=0
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
P
(
G = g | θ,pi, s,γ)P (Θ = θ | pi, s) (19)
=
s∑
θ(1)=0
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
L(θ | pi, g, s,γ)P (Θ = θ | pi, s) (20)
Next, I impose the assumptions of no interference (A.1) and a known randomization process from
the sample into the intervention arm (A.2). I have shown in Section 2 that these assumptions yield
a known functional form for the likelihood of the sample potential outcome type configuration θ
conditional on the data configuration g, the sample size s, and other parameters that govern the
randomization process from the sample into the intervention arm γ. Therefore, moving from (20)
to (21), I can remove conditioning on the population potential outcome type configuration pi from
the likelihood on the right hand side. Next, in (22), I impose the ancillary asymptotic assumption
(A.3), which specifies a known randomization process from the infinite population into the sample,
allowing me to substitute a known function h as follows:
L(pi | g, s,γ) =
s∑
θ(1)=0
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
L(θ | g, s,γ)P (Θ = θ | pi, s) (21)
=
s∑
θ(1)=0
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
L(θ | g, s,γ)h(θ | pi, s) (22)
It may seem unintuitive that the imposition of an ancillary assumption would lead to less informa-
tive inference. However, (22) provides intuition by demonstrating that the ancillary assumption is a
“simplifying” assumption. It shows that the alternative likelihood under the ancillary assumption
is a weighted average over the likelihood that I derive in Section 2, implying that the ancillary
assumption obscures information by changing the target of inference from the sample potential
outcome type configuration θ to the population potential outcome type configuration pi.
I substitute the general expression for the likelihood of the sample potential outcome type
configuration (7) into (22) to obtain a general expression for the alternative likelihood under the
ancillary assumption:
L(pi | g, s,γ) =
s∑
θ(1)=0
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
θ(1)∑
`=0
f
(
`, g(2)− `, θ(1) + θ(3) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `,
s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3) | θ, s,γ)h(θ | pi, s). (23)
In this equation, the imposition of specific cases of A.2 and A.3 implies specific functional forms
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for f and h, respectively.
Appendix B.2 Manipulation of Specific Alternative Likelihoods to Demonstrate Equivalence to
Likelihoods from the Literature
I now show that specific cases of the assumptions A.2 and A.3 yield likelihoods from Barnard
(1947) and Kline and Walters (2020). First, I introduce a specific randomization process from the
population into the sample:
A.3(urn). (Known Randomization Process into the Experiment: Urn Case). Individuals in the
sample are selected from an infinite population by drawing s names from an urn, which implies
that the sample potential outcome type configuration Θ follows a multinomial distribution
parameterized by the population potential outcome type configuration pi and the sample size
s:
h(θ | pi, s) = s!
θ(1)!θ(2)!θ(3)!
(
s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3))!pi(1)θ(1)pi(2)θ(2)pi(3)θ(3)
× (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))s−θ(1)−θ(2)−θ(3).
Although I provide two specific cases of the randomization process within the experiment, A.2(iid)
and urn A.2(urn), I only provide one specific case of the randomization process into the experiment
because it is sufficient for comparison to the literature. The specific urn case that I provide yields a
multinomial distribution because the population is infinite, but it would yield a different distribution
if the population were finite. An analogous IID case would yield an infinite sample from an infinite
population, making it incompatible with the finite sample likelihood that I derive.
To obtain an alternative likelihood equivalent to a likelihood in Barnard (1947), I impose
A.2(iid), yielding an expression for f , and I impose A.3(urn), yielding an expression for h. In
(24), I substitute these expressions into the general expression for the alternative likelihood under
the ancillary assumption in (23):
L(pi | g, s, p) =
s∑
θ(1)=0
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
θ(1)∑
`=0
binom
(
`, θ(1), p
)
binom
(
g(2)− `, θ(2), p)
× binom(θ(1)− θ(3) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `, θ(3), p)
× binom(s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3), s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3), p)
× s!
θ(1)!θ(2)!θ(3)!
(
s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3))!pi(1)θ(1)pi(2)θ(2)pi(3)θ(3)
× (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))s−θ(1)−θ(2)−θ(3) (24)
I perform several steps to show that this likelihood is equivalent to a likelihood that appears in
Barnard (1947). To begin, I switch the order of summation and adjust the summation limits
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accordingly:
L(pi | g, s, p) =
s∑
`=0
s∑
θ(1)=`
s−θ(1)∑
θ(2)=0
s−θ(1)−θ(2)∑
θ(3)=0
binom
(
`, θ(1), p
)
binom
(
g(2)− `, θ(2), p)
× binom(θ(1)− θ(3) + g(1) + g(2) + g(3)− s− `, θ(3), p)
× binom(s+ `− θ(1)− θ(3)− g(2)− g(3), s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3), p)
× s!
θ(1)!θ(2)!θ(3)!
(
s− θ(1)− θ(2)− θ(3))!pi(1)θ(1)pi(2)θ(2)pi(3)θ(3)
× (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))s−θ(1)−θ(2)−θ(3). (25)
Next, I reparameterize to remove θ(1), θ(2), and θ(3) from the expression. Without loss of gen-
erality, I replace θ(1) with t(1) + `, I replace θ(2) with t(2) + g(2) − `, and I replace θ(3) with
t(3)− t(1)− g(1)− g(2)− g(3) + s. This reparameterization yields the following expression for the
likelihood:
L(pi | g, s, p) =
s∑
`=0
s−∑`
t(1)=0
s−t(1)−g(2)∑
t(2)=`−g(2)
g(1)+g(3)−t(2)∑
t(3)=t(1)+g(1)
+g(2)+g(3)−s
binom
(
`, `+ t(1), p
)
× binom(g(2)− `, g(2)− `+ t(2), p)
× binom(t(3), t(3) + s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3)− t(1), p)
× binom(g(1)− t(3), g(1)− t(3) + g(3)− t(2), p)s![(t(1) + `)!(t(2) + g(2)− `)!
× (t(3)− t(1)− g(1)− g(2)− g(3) + s)!(g(1) + g(3)− t(1)− t(3))!]−1pi(1)t(1)+`
× pi(2)t(2)+g(2)−`pi(3)t(3)−t(1)−g(1)−g(2)−g(3)+s
× (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))g(1)+g(3)−t(1)−t(3). (26)
Next, I change the limits of summation to reflect the fact that the summand equals zero if the first
argument of any of the binomial distribution functions is negative or if the second argument of any
of the binomial distribution functions is less than the first. Starting with the outer summation, we
know that ` is at most g(2) such that the second binomial distribution function is non-zero. Since
s ≥ g(2), we can replace the upper limit of the outer summation with g(2). Next, we know that
t(1) is at most s − g(1) − g(2) − g(3) such that the third binomial distribution is non-zero. Since
s − g(1) − g(2) − g(3) ≤ s − ` for all ` between zero and g(2), we can replace the upper limit of
the second summation with s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3). Through similar arguments, we can replace the
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limits in the remaining two summations:
L(pi | g, s, p) =
g(2)∑
`=0
s−g(1)−g(2)
−g(3)∑
t(1)=0
g(3)∑
t(2)=0
g(1)∑
t(3)=0
binom
(
`, `+ t(1), p
)
× binom(g(2)− `, g(2)− `+ t(2), p)
× binom(t(3), t(3) + s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3)− t(1), p)
× binom(g(1)− t(3), g(1)− t(3) + g(3)− t(2), p)s![(t(1) + `)!(t(2) + g(2)− `)!
× (t(3)− t(1)− g(1)− g(2)− g(3) + s)!(g(1) + g(3)− t(1)− t(3))!]−1pi(1)t(1)+`
× pi(2)t(2)+g(2)−`pi(3)t(3)−t(1)−g(1)−g(2)−g(3)+s
× (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))g(1)+g(3)−t(1)−t(3). (27)
With these changes of indices, the summations in (27) are independent. Therefore, I gather terms
and expand using the definition of the binomial distribution as follows:
L(pi | g, s, p) = s!pg(1)+g(2)(1− p)s−g(1)−g(2)
[
g(2)∑
`=0
pi(1)`pi(2)g(2)−`
`!
(
g(2)− `)!
]
×
[ s−g(1)−g(2)−g(3)∑
t(1)=0
pi(1)t(1)pi(3)s−g(1)−g(2)−g(3)−t(1)
t(1)!
(
s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3)− t(1))!
]
×
[
g(3)∑
t(2)=0
pi(2)t(2)
(
1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))g(3)−t(2)
t(2)!
(
g(3)− t(2))!
]
×
[
g(1)∑
t(3)=0
pi(3)t(3)
(
1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))g(1)−t(3)
t(3)!
(
g(1)− t(3))!
]
(28)
By the binomial theorem, I can express (28) as follows:
L(pi | g, s, p) = s!
g(1)!g(2)!g(3)!(s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3))!p
g(1)+g(2)(1− p)s−g(1)−g(2)
× [pi(3) + (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))]g(1)[pi(1) + pi(2)]g(2)
× [pi(2) + (1− pi(1)− pi(2)− pi(3))]g(3)[pi(1) + pi(3)]s−g(1)−g(2)−g(3)
=
s!
g(1)!g(2)!g(3)!(s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3))!p
g(1)+g(2)(1− p)s−g(1)−g(2)
× [1− pi(1)− pi(2)]g(1)[pi(1) + pi(2)]g(2)
× [1− pi(1)− pi(3)]g(3)[pi(1) + pi(3)]s−g(1)−g(2)−g(3). (29)
The expression in (29) is equivalent to a likelihood function from Barnard (1947) under a reparam-
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eterization.3
Under the specific assumptions A.2(urn) and A.3(urn), I can use a similar procedure to express
a different specific likelihood as follows:
L(pi | g, s,m) =
(
m
g(1)
)
[1− pi(1)− pi(2)]g(1)[pi(1) + pi(2)]m−g(1)
×
(
s−m
g(3)
)
[1− pi(1)− pi(3)]g(3)[pi(1) + pi(3)]s−m−g(3). (30)
The expression in (30) is equivalent to a likelihood from Barnard (1947) and a likelihood from Kline
and Walters (2020) under reparameterizations.4
Appendix B.3 Informative Inference on Defiers Using Specific Alternative Likelihoods under an
Ancillary Simplifying Asymptotic Assumption is Impossible
I conclude by introducing impossibility results that show that the likelihoods in (29) and (30)
cannot be used for informative inference on the number of defiers. That is, if the point estimate
of the average intervention effect indicates there are more compliers than defiers, inference based
on the likelihoods in (29) and (30) cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero defiers. To do so,
I will show that the set of population potential outcome type configurations that maximizes the
likelihood in (29) or (30) always includes a population potential outcome type configuration with
zero defiers when the point estimate of the average intervention effect indicates there are more
compliers than defiers. As proof, suppose p̂i = (pi(1), pi(2), pi(3), 1 − pi(1) − pi(2) − pi(3)) is an
estimate of the population potential outcome type configuration that maximizes the likelihood in
(29) or (30). The implied average intervention effect pi(3) − pi(2) will equal its point estimate
g(1)/(g(1) + g(2)) − g(3)/(s − g(1) − g(2)), which can be confirmed by maximizing the likelihood
functions in (29) and (30) analytically. If the point estimate of the average intervention effect is
positive, it indicates that there are more compliers than defiers. In this case, there is a population
potential outcome type configuration that maximizes the likelihood and has no defiers, (pi(1) +
pi(2), 0, pi(3)− pi(2), 1− pi(1)− pi(3)), since:
L(p̂i, s,γ) = L(pi(1) + pi(2), 0, pi(3)− pi(2), 1− pi(1)− pi(3) | g, s,γ). (31)
It is straightforward to verify this claim by evaluating the likelihoods (29) and (30) at these popula-
tion potential outcome type configurations and showing that (31) holds. Thus, the set of population
potential outcome type configurations that maximize the likelihood includes a population potential
outcome type configuration with no defiers when the point estimate of the average intervention
effect indicates there are more compliers than defiers. Therefore, informative inference on the share
3To translate from Barnard (1947), who presents this likelihood in equation (4), N → s, a → g(1), b → g(2),
c→ g(3), d→ s− g(1)− g(2)− g(3), pa1 → p(1− pi(1)− pi(2)), pa2 → p(pi(1) + pi(2)), pb1 → (1− p)(1− pi(1)− pi(3)),
and pb2 → (1− p)(pi(1) + pi(3)).
4To translate from Barnard (1947), who presents this likelihood in equation (2), n→ s−m, a→ g(1), b→ g(3),
c → m − g(1), d → s − m − g(3), pa → 1 − pi(1) − pi(2), and pb → 1 − pi(1) − pi(3). To translate from Kline
and Walters (2020), who present this likelihood in equation (1), Lw → m, Lb → s − m, cw → g(1), cb → g(3),
pjw → 1− pi(1)− pi(2), and pjb → 1− pi(1)− pi(3).
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of defiers is impossible using the likelihoods in (29) and (30). Equation (31) also demonstrates that
informative inference on the ratio of defiers to compliers is impossible using these likelihoods. When
the point estimate of the average intervention effect is negative, a similar procedure demonstrates
that informative inference on the number of compliers is not possible using these likelihoods. These
impossibility results hold for any finite sample size s.
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